Background Briefing: An Assessment of EU-China Relations in Global Governance Forums

Executive Summary
China and the European Union are both confronting a critical transition, whose outcomes will affect the medium to long-term horizon of EU-China cooperation at the multilateral level. Beijing needs to reignite stalled political reforms at home, and strike a new balance between state intervention in the economy and market play to guarantee the sustainability of China's development. In Europe, the outcome of the euro crisis will determine how the material constitution of an increasingly two-speed Union shapes up and whether the EU can emerge as a more cohesive multi-level actor, addressing China's frustration with Brussels's seeming inability to act as a more autonomous 'pole' in international affairs.
With the recent financial crisis marking a systemic watershed, the EU should aim to create strategic space for engaging China in the re-moulding of the institutional landscape of postcrisis global finance and trade. As the post-neoliberal era awaits defining, the Union has an opportunity to upgrade the profile of European discourses on economic governance and leverage Beijing's manifest interest in reforming the international monetary and financial systems. This would anchor China to a more legitimate international order, and provide constructive exogenous pressure for Beijing to implement difficult domestic reforms which can have global implications, including on key European economic interests.
The G20 is regarded both by China and the EU as a critical platform to generate political momentum for more effective global governance. Beijing has actively raised its profile from peripheral to core actor within the G20, as the forum fits several of its foreign policy priorities, including the enhancement of China's status, mitigation of external pressures, and trust generation. For the EU the G20 is instrumental to increase internal cohesion and ensure that newly-emerged and emerging countries perceive to have a stake in global governance. The EU and China share an ambition for the G20 to pursue sustainable global growth by encouraging diffuse domestic structural adjustments, fiscal consolidation in advanced economies, and the restructuring of China's development paradigm to reduce global imbalances. Despite an apparent decline in effectiveness after 2009, the G20 has made progress in multilateral regulatory oversight through the Financial Stability Board. As the international financial system stabilises, it is now important for the EU to engage China in defining a post-emergency mission for the G20, and designing a new G20+ institutional formula with an agile permanent secretariat, coupled with a G20 advisory council of independent experts.
The EU can leverage the political capital arising from more robust leadership in the reform of Bretton Woods institutions to steer China's manifest interest in a more level international monetary playing field through joint contingency planning in preparation for a multipolar phase, to be followed by a new multilateral regime. Monetary and financial stability can be strengthened by China diversifying its currency portfolio and spreading risk: the EU can build on a strategic convergence of interests with China in this field by positioning the Euro credibly as a global reserve currency and supporting the gradual internationalisation of the renmimbi.
The EU and China are active participants in the WTO legal framework, reinforcing the role of the WTO dispute settlement system as a stand-in for incremental trade regulation. Pursuing a Giovanni B. Andornino 3 of 13 comprehensive negotiation of a Europe-wide agreement on investment with China, while deploying a comprehensive EU external public procurement policy would further encourage China to fulfil its obligations in the WTO and increase the staying power of free trade at a particularly critical juncture. This would create opportunities abroad and cut government costs at home both in Europe and in China and would be coherent with the EU's 2020 Strategy and China's 12 th Five-Year Programme, which converge on the strategic pursuit of green and sustainable growth based on an innovative economy.
Main points
• Both the European Union and China are facing a phase of critical transition domestically, whose outcomes will bear significant consequences on the medium to long-term horizon of EU-China cooperation at the multilateral level.
• China has shown increasing frustration with the EU's seeming inability to emerge as a more unified, autonomous 'pole' in international affairs, but in the aftermath of the recent systemic crisis the EU can aim to create new strategic space for engaging China in the remoulding of the institutional landscape of the global financial and monetary systems.
• China has grown to regard the G20 as the most important multilateral global governance platform for economic and financial matters, and one coherent with several of its foreign policy priorities, including status enhancement, mitigation of external pressures, trust generation, and access to opportunities to become better acquainted with multilateral governance practices.
• The EU and China support the G20 to pursue sustainable global growth by encouraging diffuse domestic structural adjustments, fiscal consolidation in advanced economies, and the restructuring of China's development paradigm to reduce global imbalances.
• Despite an apparent decline in G20 performance since 2009, progress has been made in multilateral regulatory oversight through the Financial Stability Board; the EU should encourage China to support a more ambitious G20+ formula with an agile permanent secretariat, coupled with a G20 advisory council of independent experts.
• While EU-China cooperation in the IMF is affected by the over-representation of Member
States and the non-representation of the EU itself, the EU should leverage the political capital arising from more robust leadership in the reform of Bretton Woods institutions (including relinquishing traditional European prerogatives over the office of IMF director and unilaterally renouncing a potential eurozone veto power) to steer China's interest in a more level international monetary playing field through joint contingency planning in preparation for a multipolar phase, to be followed by a new multilateral regime.
• Fundamentally aligned in support of free-trade, the EU and China are active participants in the WTO legal framework, reinforcing the role of the WTO dispute settlement system as a stand-in for incremental trade regulation, which helps to preserve the overall staying power of free trade at the current critical juncture.
• Through an early concession of Market Economy Status and the de-linking of non-trade goals from trade negotiations, the EU should neutralise irritants with China and focus on an ambitious Europe-wide agreement on investment with China and on the development of a comprehensive EU external public procurement policy to induce the Chinese authorities to fulfil their obligations in the WTO by submitting a comprehensive Government Procurement Agreement, better aligning to international standards, and generally increasing market access for EU companies in China.
Introduction: Europe, China and Multilateralism
Both the European Union and China are facing a phase of critical transition domestically, whose outcomes will bear significant consequences on the medium to long-term horizon of EU-China cooperation at the multilateral level. The PRC's frustration with the seeming inability of the EU to emerge as a more unified and autonomous 'pole' in international affairs, especially with regards to specific US desires, accounts for the relative loss of momentum in EU-China relations since the mid-2000. Today, however, just as the dynamics generated by the financial crisis risk further denting the Union's profile as a meaningful partner at the multilateral level, the structural fragility of the global economic landscape offers strategic space for constructive engagement with China.
The G20: Catalysing Political Impulse to Enhance Global Governance
Established by the diplomacies of the US and major European countries, which remain the principal agenda setters, the G20 Leaders' Summit is one of the few multilateral forums where China has actively raised its profile from peripheral to core actor. Beijing has grown to regard the G20 as the most important multilateral global governance platform for economic and financial matters. As a forum operating by consensus to reform the global regulatory system, enhance surveillance and improve cooperation among the world's main advanced and emerging economies, the G20 fits several key foreign policy priorities of the Chinese government:
-it allows China to see its status as a newly-emerged global power entrenched without being associated with the 'hegemonistic' aura of the Western-dominated G8;
-it preserves the strategic ambiguity of the PRC's profile as a world power that can choose to cast itself as merely the 'largest developing country' to mitigate external pressure and claim diplomatic affinity with developing nations;
-it reduces the risk of an undesired drift towards a G-2 or G-3 configuration of global governance practices, which would force China to abandon its cherished approach of 'keeping a low profile and acting proactively in a prudent, parsimonious way';
-it facilitates a relatively hands-off learning process in an informal context where Chinese leaders can present China's positions and foster trust.
For the European Union, which has its own seat at the G20 in addition to the four attributed to its largest Member States, the visibility and political weight acquired by the forum shapes a de facto dual system of global governance. It raises questions about its representativeness and how informal multilateral political impulse is translated into verifiable binding commitments. However, lack of consensus for substantial reform of the UN and other formal institutions, means that the G20 forum has become a critical proxy to ensure that newly-emerged and emerging countries perceive to have a stake in global governance. This is especially true for China, whose self-awareness as the linchpin of the global economy has been nurtured by its participation at G20 meetings, fostering a more assertive posture that eschews past behaviour as a rule-taker.
Both the EU and China have benefited domestically from participation in the G20. EU coordination ahead of summits has improved, increasing its credibility as the Union takes advantage of the G20 platform to protect the euro while advancing a wider reform agenda for the global financial architecture. China has found in the G20 an ideal forum to move past its tendency to passively adapt to international norms or engage in preventive revisionism, honing its understanding of global governance practices. G20 recommendations also serve as an expedient external pressure to enhance the domestic political momentum for Beijing's economic reforms.
The performance of the G20 has appeared to suffer from a decline in effectiveness after the hardly needed to be generated -as intense pressure was brought about by chaos in the financial markets and an immediate risk of systemic financial meltdown -with the global financial system now seemingly more stable, the urgency to define a post-emergency mission for the G20 has become apparent. This is a crucial debate in which the EU can leverage its unparalleled experience in multilateral governance to engage China in proposing that the G20 be cast -and reported about -as an incremental, drawn-out process with clearer mediumterm ambitions. 
Bretton Woods: Reforming the IMF into a 'barking watchdog'
EU-China cooperation in the International
Concluding Remarks and Policy Recommendations
While management of expectations remains important to maximise the impact of the EU's commitment to cooperating with China in global governance forums, it is essential that the Union upgrades the profile of European discourses on economic governance as we wait to define the post-neoliberal era. Depending on its future domestic developments, the EU can aim to create strategic space for engaging China in the re-moulding of the institutional landscape of post-crisis global finance and trade. This would both anchor China to a more representative and legitimate international order, and provide constructive exogenous pressure for Beijing to implement vital domestic reforms with systemic implications.
Europe's experience in multilateral trust-building via the encapsulation of partners' interests is a key asset. Its finalistic approach, however, is at odds with Chinese culture at large, and specifically with Beijing's current perspective that an emerging power is best served by time-biding, free-riding behaviour. Greater intra-EU solidarity, substantive and perceived EU loyalty to global governance, and a new capacity to bargain hard on a lean, cohesive portfolio of key desired outcomes will place the EU on a stronger footing in preventing global order erosion.
The G20 has to date been one of the most successful instances of China's active participation in global governance forums. The European Union should resist the widening of the G20 mandate to include overly ambitious development and climate agendas, given that unhelpful normative abrasion is likely to occur with China in these fields. Rather, the Union should leverage common strategic interests to cooperate with China in focusing the G20 agenda on the reform of the international financial and monetary systems. New codes of conduct and regulatory regimes for sovereign rating agencies would be a substantial first step forward to create the momentum for more ambitious measures, including in the definition of a regime for managing hot capital flows that can be the cause of extreme market volatility.
While the intergovernmental nature of the G20 summits at head of state level is an asset to be preserved, at the institutional level, the EU should encourage China to support a more ambitious G20+ formula. Here, the limitations currently imposed by the rotating chair system could be tackled through the establishment of an agile permanent secretariat, coupled with a G20 advisory council. While the secretariat would serve as a tool to avert risks of fragmentation and short-termism in the definition and pursuit of the G20 agenda, independent experts making up the advisory council would be tasked with strengthening intra-G20 peer-review processes, preventing their deterioration into 'peer protection' dynamicswhich, in an age of intense interdependence, would be lethal to the G20 and to global interest at large. The council ought to be afforded a degree of concurrent authority over the G20 agenda with the latitude to make recommendation proposals and it should be guaranteed adequate media visibility. Both entities should be based in Asia to balance the Western-centric arrangements of other global institutions, with Hong Kong a potential candidate as host city.
The European Union should further engage China's manifest interest in reforming the international monetary system. By relinquishing traditional European prerogatives over the office of the IMF director and unilaterally renouncing a potential eurozone veto power, the EU would make a powerful contribution to the reform of the IMF into a more independent, veto- investment with China, which would improve the current patchwork of bilateral agreements to the benefit of both EU and Chinese investors. Contextually, it should finalise the development of a comprehensive EU external public procurement policy that includes mechanisms to encourage the EU's trading partners to start market access discussions where necessary. The objective should be to induce the Chinese authorities to fulfil their obligations in the WTO and submit a comprehensive Government Procurement Agreement offer that reflects public procurement realities (i.e. that a large proportion of China's public procurement is carried out at local levels and by state-owned enterprises). The EU should stress that GPA implementation would create opportunities abroad and cut government costs at home for China, while an agreement that encourages European investments into its economy would foster innovation and competition in China, in line with its 12th Five-year programme.
